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Abstract 
Climate change adaptation is an increasingly important field and will involve a range of 
actors from national governments to private companies, communities and households. 
There is a growing policy discourse supporting the involvement of the private sector in 
adaptation, however there is little empirical examination to show how the sector might be 
involved and how adaptation might be governed.  This paper uses evidence from the field of 
risk governance and insurance and analytical frameworks from the wider governance 
literature to draw important findings for the governance of adaptation. We use the recently 
published Compendium of Disaster Risk Initiatives in the Developing World and a case study 
of agricultural insurance in India to argue that the role of the private sector is increasing but 
so far within a particular model of engagement. In the context of climate change, how the 
public-private relationships are constructed is key to how adaptation can be leveraged from 
such an arrangement. The evidence in this paper suggests that due to commercial viability 
and other concerns there will continue to be a role for the public sector alongside the 
private sector to ensure adaptation measures address vulnerability. In conclusion we argue 
that the type of relationship between the public and the private actors has a significant 
influence on the adaptation outcomes.  The question is not purely about involving the 
private sector which is how this is currently framed within policy and academic work on 
adaptation, but how the private actors are engaged. . Governments seeking to engage 
private actors need to build those relationships with the desired adaptation outcomes in 
mind.  
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change adaptation is now an accepted part of climate policy along with mitigation, 
and the engagement of the private sector in adaptation has become a growing policy 
paradigm. Unlike the rhetoric of climate change mitigation, which is highly centralised and 
government-driven, it is known that the governance of adaptation will be more 
decentralised and much will take place beyond the official ‘adaptation decisions’ of the 
nation-state or the UNFCCC (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). Decisions will be taken by a 
variety of private actors from individuals to households and firms that will impact on 
societal exposure to risk. Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the diversity of 
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governance arrangements that will be needed in adaptation, there has so far been little 
empirical examination of the emerging role of the private sector in the area. 
To address this gap, this paper borrows evidence from a related field: we ask how the roles 
of the public and private sector have changed over time in the governance of natural 
disasters and insurance and what we can learn from this for climate change adaptation. This 
field shares common goals with climate adaptation, such as reducing vulnerability and increasing 
resilience to extreme weatherGovernance of natural hazards risk has a long history and 
involves a similar mix of public and private players. We therefore take the example of an 
industry that has been involved in this area for several decades, the insurance industry, to 
explore what can be learned for climate change adaptation from this example. Insurance 
risk transfer has been used for centuries as a tool to manage the risk of uncertain losses. In 
its most basic form insurance is a mechanism where risks or part of a risk are transferred 
from the insured to the insurer in return for a premium payment. In this paper, we review 
the current governance literature on adaptation and from this suggest two strategies for 
addressing our research question: using insights from natural hazard governance and 
insurance, and adopting analytical frameworks from the broader governance literature. We 
then go on to outline our methods and findings using the example of one type of insurance 
(crop) in one country (India). Finally, in the analysis and conclusions we explore how the 
relationships between public and private actors have changed over time and what this adds 
to an understanding of the governance of climate adaptation.  
2. The governance of adaptation and risk 
 
Theories of governance have been applied to global climate politics in an attempt to explain 
the multiple new relationships and modes of governing that were emerging around this 
issue. As noted by many of the governance scholars, arrangements are rarely composed of 
just one type of actor and public-private or hybrid partnerships have been emerging as an 
important area of future research in climate governance, creating “new niches in the 
multilateral system” (Andonova and Mitchell, 2010; Backstrand et al., 2010). Whilst these 
arguments are increasingly well rehearsed in the context of mitigation (see for example 
Backstrand, 2008), there are still significant gaps in our understanding of adaptation 
governance.  
2.1 Governance of adaptation 
The governance of adaptation is fundamentally different to the challenges of the 
governance of mitigation. Firstly, adaptation policies do not require collective action and 
therefore are not reliant on national government agreements and international frameworks 
(apart from the need for extra financing). Secondly, local adaptation can potentially make a 
significant difference to household and community outcomes whereas a small quantity of 
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mitigation will not have local or global effects. Therefore, since its inception adaptation has 
involved a wide range of actors and processes including individuals and households, 
communities, firms and governments. Adaptation can be both reactive to an unexpected 
hazard or planned in preparation for a hazard or changing environment and again this may 
involve a different range of actors. The role of governments in adaptation planning is to 
provide political leadership, provide and protect public goods such as research, 
infrastructure and cultural sites, and provide support for local adaptation infrastructure 
(Fankhauser and Fisher, forthcoming). Communities, households and individuals all have a 
role to play in adaptation measures, as do local governments. Governments and other 
actors help to create the enabling structures around households and communities that 
structure local adaptation choices. As adaptation involves a much wider range of actors than 
simply the national government it also involves more diffuse modes of governing and 
authority. As well as policy programmes and state authority actors need to use softer modes 
of governing such as information dissemination or using best practice examples to set social 
and cultural norms. Determining which actors at which scales should engage in adaptive 
action is a significant question for the future (Adger et al., 2005). The assessment of 
governance in the context of climate change adaptation is a relatively new area, and there 
are still some significant gaps in analysis.  
Firstly, despite a normative international policy position supporting their involvement very 
little is known about the potential role of the private sector in adaptation governance 
(Agrawala et al., 2011; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; PWC, 2010).  Initial research in this 
area has focused on identifying and classifying the different actors currently involved (see 
Agrawala et al., 2011; Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; PWC, 2010; Tompkins et al., 2010) or 
analysing the theoretical roles for different actors (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). This is 
partly due to a scarcity of examples, most of the adaptation measures in developed 
countries have been proactive measures taken by government at national, regional or local 
level (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Tompkins et al., 2010). In least developed countries 
governments have been responsible for developing the National Adaptation Plans (NAPAs) 
and are the main receivers of climate finance directed from the UNFCCC and other 
adaptation funds. However, there is an increasing focus on the potential role of 
organisations in the private sector as implementers of climate change adaptation policies 
within the climate policy discourse. The Nairobi work programme of the UNFCCC on private 
sector engagement stresses “the unique expertise of the private sector, its capacity to 
innovate and produce new technologies for adaptation, and its financial leverage can form 
an important part of the multi-sectoral partnership that is required between governmental, 
private and non-governmental actors” (UNFCCC, 2012).  The private sector will have a role 
to play in the adaptation of climate change both through managing their own exposure to 
risks and using the opportunity of opening markets for adaptation projects and products.  
Secondly, there has been an emergence of conceptual frameworks put forward to 
understand what is good adaptation (Adger et al., 2005; Tompkins et al., 2010), what 
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underlying factors support adaptation (Jones et al., 2010; WRI, 2010), and how to evaluate 
adaptation measures (Brooks et al., 2011; PPCRWorkingGroup, 2010-11). Whilst these have 
provided a wealth of ways to think about adaptive capacity, vulnerability and resilience this 
has not provided many conceptual frameworks to consider the governance of adaptation. 
We suggest that the actors involved and how they interact is an increasingly important 
factor in building successful adaptation policies. Many adaptation policies or programmes 
contain implicit assumptions of the role of the national government and the private sector 
for example, but these are rarely explicitly justified or explained and research on adaptation 
has not yet provided conceptual frameworks to consider the governance structures within 
the field. In this paper we seek to address these gaps by underpinning our work with 
empirical evidence from the field of risk governance and applying existing analytical tools for 
assessing public-private roles from the wider sphere of governance. These tools offer a new 
perspective on adaptation governance that contributes to a development in the field. 
2.2 Governance of risk: the example of insurance 
In our search for empirical evidence and historical context we turn to the area of natural 
disaster governance and insurance. Emerging from the field of risk governance, research in 
this area explores the management of natural hazards and disasters by public and private 
actors at local, national and multi-national levels (see Kuhlicke et al. 2011; Ahrens and 
Rudolph 2006). The most notable recent effort to draw out the synergies between 
adaptation and natural disaster risk reduction is the IPCC’s Special Report on Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (Field et al., 
2012), which brought together experts in both fields. The report notes the small but 
increasingly important role the private sector is playing in disaster risk reduction but 
highlights the uncertainty of this under future climatic conditions and the need for 
“innovative private-public sector partnerships … to better estimate and price risk as well as 
to develop robust insurance related products” (p347). Drawing on this work, we identify two 
areas significant to an analysis of the governance of adaptation. These are: the range of 
relationships between public and private actors and the varying roles for each, as well as the 
importance of risk transfer and risk reduction in adaptation risk responses.  
The empirical evidence of natural hazard governance is relatively rich, with some examples 
such as building of dykes dating back far into human history. Walker et al. (2010) explore 
natural hazard governance in Europe and conclude that governance of natural disasters has 
seen similar shifts to governance overall: more engagement of multiple actors, networks 
and partnerships, the appearance of multilevel governance and shifts of responsibility away 
from the state. But they also point out that the approaches to natural hazard governance 
vary significantly across countries. Insurance, as a sector with a history of involvement in 
natural disaster risk management, is often referenced by the literature to illustrate the 
multi-actor nature of this area and to explore the roles of these different actors, and in 
particular, the private sector (Walker et.al 2010). 
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But the application of insurance to manage the impacts of natural disasters is unevenly 
applied across the world, with the extent and scope of risk transfer varying from country to 
country. In general terms the penetration of insurance cover is mainly determined by 
income levels – with insurance in most low-income and middle-income countries still in its 
infancy. Insurance risk transfer can take many different forms and shapes, ranging from 
micro-insurance to sovereign disaster risk pools, with various degrees of public and private 
engagement. The technical aspects of these different types and their economic 
effectiveness have been explored in the literature (see Cummins and Mahul 2009) and there 
are suggestions that some of the schemes are more suited for private sector engagement 
than others (see for example Paudel 2012). While this is an important aspect when 
investigating public and private roles, a detailed analysis of this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. The key point to draw from this is the fact that public and private actors are engaged 
in natural disaster governance and insurance in a wide range of forms.  
Considering natural disaster governance and insurance in the context of climate change 
brings up another important issue: the question of insurability. Some experts warn that risks 
might become uninsurable in the future (see Charpentier 2008; Herweijer et al. 2009), 
others argue that there are some clear opportunities for the insurance sector to develop 
new products (Mills 2009). One key aspect emerging in this context is the importance of 
linking risk transfer to risk reduction, which could be seen as an effort to address the 
insurability challenge of rising risk levels (Ward et al. 2008). Fundamentally, insurance 
removes or reduces the risk of experiencing an uncertain financial loss, but it is widely 
recognised that it can also play a role in physical risk reduction and adaptation. The IPCC’s 
SREX concludes that “risk sharing (formal insurance, micro-insurance, crop insurance) can be 
a tool for risk reduction and for recovering livelihoods” but also warns that it could also 
provide disincentives, if not correctly structured (Cutter et al. 2012, p.294/5). 
Suarez and Linneroth-Bayer (2011) investigate the suitability of insurance related 
instruments for disaster risk reduction in vulnerable developing countries and  conclude that 
they “can increase disaster resilience, not only as an ex post complement to pre-disaster risk 
reduction but also as an ex ante vehicle to promote vulnerability reduction, hazard 
management and disaster preparedness”, while outlining a range of barriers and challenges 
for the successful application of insurance in developing countries. Studies on the role of 
insurance in supporting climate change adaptation come to a similar conclusion.  While risk 
transfer is no magic solution for all climate risks, there is evidence that, if applied correctly, 
it can play a cost-effective role in a country’s efforts to increase its climate resilience. 
(Warner et al. 2009). Surminski (2010) provides an illustration of how some insurers are 
engaged in adaptation activities in developed markets – with those initiatives identified 
ranging from raising awareness of climate risks, promoting action by Government, and 
supporting action of individuals through incentives, information and financial means. 
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Clearly the above points are not the only drivers influencing the use of insurance risk 
transfer for disaster governance and adaptation. There are a range of other factors, such as 
financial literacy, risk awareness, distribution channels, regulatory frameworks and 
enforcement of property rights that can all influence the development and suitability of this 
specific tool. An assessment of these drivers is beyond the scope of this paper (see Feyen et 
al.2011 and Hussels et al.2005 for reviews).  
For our analysis of risk and adaptation governance the wide variety of private-public- role 
combinations and the broad range of different approaches to insurance and adaptation are 
important and demand more in-depth analysis of existing examples of insurance.   
2.3 Analytical tools for analysis 
To deepen our engagement with the governance of adaptation we turn to the broader field 
of governance analysis. Theorists have explored how governance moves across scales in 
theories of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003) as well as the implications for 
the role of the state and other actors (Arts et al., 2001; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; 
Jagers and Stripple, 2003). Whilst governance theories are diverse, one of the unifying 
analytical points lies in the ability “to move beyond state-centric analyses to include a focus 
on the processes of governance, to highlight the power of non-state actors, and to identify 
and theorize about the changing forms and institutionalization of political authority” 
(Sending and Neumann 2006 p651).  
We use the work of Borsel and Risse (2005) to explore the nature of the relationship  
between the public and the private actors in governance and combine this with an analysis 
of modes of governing, developed by Andonova et al. (2010), to extend the analysis to 
consider new forms of governance and authority beyond traditional public-private 
relationships. It is quite common in the literature to describe the relationship between 
public and private actors in the context of public private partnerships (PPP) and this is the 
terminology employed by Borsel and Risse. However, the connotation of PPP has become 
quite diffuse, ranging from well-defined private infrastructure financing schemes to more 
loosely connected forms of collaboration between public and private sectors. We therefore 
refrain from using the term PPP and adapt the Borsel and Risse framework accordingly, by 
using their typology to explore the details of the relationships between public and private 
actors whilst not labelling these as partnerships per se. Whilst Borsel and Risse describe 
their framework in terms of governance (see 2010) they use a particular terminology of 
regulation. Again, we find that in the context of insurance these terms have particular 
usages and to avoid confusion we use the broader term of ‘governance’ where they use 
‘regulation’. Borsel and Risse (2005) provide a typology of these relationships ranging from 
“private self-governance in the shadow of hierarchy”, to “delegation to private actors”, to 
“co-governance of public and private actors” and “consultation and co-option of private 
actors”. We also consider in this context that as well as the “shadow of hierarchy” there is 
also the “shadow of opportunity” that can motivate private actors to self-govern in order to 
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ready themselves for new market opportunities. This is particularly true in the context of 
climate change. Either side of these mixed arrangements are public governance and private 
self-governance. We summarise each category in the table below. 
Table 1: Borsel and Risse (2005) amended typology of public-private relationships 
Increasing autonomy of private actors                               Increasing autonomy of public actors 
Private self-
governance 
Private self-
governance 
in the 
shadow of 
hierarchy (or 
opportunity) 
Delegation to 
private 
actors. 
Co-
governance 
of public and 
private 
actors 
Consultation 
and co-
option of 
private 
actors 
Public 
governance 
No public 
involvement. 
 
Private actors 
fearing punitive 
legislation act 
to self-regulate. 
Could also 
apply in case of 
anticipating 
new business 
opportunities. 
Delegation of 
specific 
functions such 
as outsourcing 
of public 
services. 
Involves varying 
levels of 
autonomy. 
 
Joint decision-
making over an 
issue. 
Using expertise 
of private 
sector. 
No private 
involvement. 
 
This paper also applies the analytical framework of Andonova et al (2009) to analyse how 
actors might govern (defined as “steering towards public goals”) without state authority. 
The framework was developed to explore transnational governance through non-state 
actors in climate change. Whilst some of the risk governance discussed in this paper is 
national, as will be shown later there are transnational elements and the framework helps 
elucidate the modes of governing between non-state actors even within a nation-state. 
Andonova et al. (2009) identify three core governance functions that help understand how 
steering takes place, these are: information sharing; capacity building and implementation; 
and rule-setting. We now turn to the empirical findings of the paper, before going on to 
analyse the significance of these findings for the literature on adaptation. 
3. The Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives and a case study 
analysis of crop insurance in India 
 
To analyse the role of the private sector in the governance of adaptation we use the 
Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World (ClimateWise 
2011) and a case study of agricultural insurance schemes in India from the 1970s to 2012. 
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Most of the schemes in developing countries are relatively new and still being tested as pilot 
projects and estimating the resilience and sustainability of these schemes is very difficult. 
The Compendium offers an original analysis of the breadth of the sector whilst India’s 
agricultural crop insurance as one of the longest-running schemes in operation for weather 
and climate risks offers an in-depth angle to explore the role of private actors over time. 
Schemes have been in operation in some form since the 1970s, and currently covering over 
25 million farmers. Since 2007 they are being provided by a mix of public-and private 
players. The data collection and analysis has been done in four parts. Firstly, we used the 
Compendium to analyse the broader roles of public and private actors in insurance schemes 
in low and middle-income countries. Secondly, we conducted a review of policy documents 
and secondary literature about the crop insurance schemes in India analysing the role of 
different actors over time and the potential for adaptation. This was supplemented with an 
analysis of India’s climate policies and the role of insurance and the private sector in such 
policies. Thirdly, we conducted stakeholder interviews between November 2011 and 
February 2012 with key actors in the public and private companies currently involved in 
delivering agricultural crop insurance schemes. Interviewees were selected as being in a 
senior role managing the agricultural insurance portfolio of the company. Questions were 
asked about the company involvement with the sector, relationships between the private 
and the public insurers, the challenges and barriers, and the changing risks associated with 
climate change. This included a representative from the AIC and private insurers providing 
the WBCIS and mNAIS as well as their own private schemes
1
. Lastly, we analysed the climate 
policies and policy signals around insurance and climate change in the Indian context. 
 
3.1 The Compendium: linking risk transfer and risk reduction 
The Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing Worl, recently 
published by ClimateWise,  offers a snapshot of current risk transfer activities in low- and 
middle-income countries. The Compendium documents 123 existing initiatives in middle-
income and lower-income countries that involve the transfer of financial risk associated 
with the occurrence of natural hazards. This presents a diverse picture, with schemes often 
created to meet very specific needs in a particular community, with a wide range of 
stakeholders being involved, and differing levels of risk transfer being provided. The 
Compendium offers an opportunity to explore the extent to which risk transfer and risk 
reduction/adaptation are linked, a crucial factor in determining whether insurance and the 
private sector can play a role in not just transferring risk but also reducing it. In an analysis 
of the Compendium, Surminski and Oramas–Dorta (2011) show that the full potential for 
utilizing risk transfer for adaptation is far from exhausted: very few schemes show a direct 
operational link between risk transfer and risk reduction, and only one to have explicitly 
                                                          
1
 Interviewees were from the following companies: AIC, ICICI Lombard, IDFCC-Tokyo, HDFC Ergo and brokers, 
BASIX and Microensure. 
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taken into account the impact of climate change on risk levels. The Compendium also 
documents the relative roles of the public and private sector. For those schemes where a 
direct link between risk transfer and risk reduction is recorded, the authors notice that the 
public sector plays a larger role than in those schemes without risk reduction linkage: in 
these cases the public is involved in the provision of risk transfer (55%), which compares to 
the 40% based on the whole Compendium (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2011).  Insurance 
risk transfer comes in a variety of forms and shapes. The Compendium highlights the range 
of different roles that public, private and third sector actors play in the provision of risk 
transfer. Beyond the core underwriting function, which is being done by private sector in 
89% of cases, there are a wide range of support functions for the implementation and 
operation of these risk transfer schemes, such as funding of technical assistance projects, 
financing of scheme feasibility studies, education and capacity building or development of 
data infrastructure, (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2011) which appear to be receiving public 
funding in 68% of all cases in the Compendium.  
The evidence from the Compendium shows that the role of the private sector is growing but 
the relationship between risk transfer and risk reduction is often linked with the 
involvement of the public sector, as are a wide range of support functions. This evidence 
suggests that the governance of risk in the context of adaptation, may not be purely about a 
public or private actor but a combination or actors working in different forms of 
governance. 
3.2  The case study: Agricultural insurance in India 
Two thirds of the Indian population is dependent on agriculture as their main source of 
livelihood with 70% of the farming community described as small and marginal farmers. This 
explains why agriculture risk management including crop insurance has received relatively 
high political attention and support. In the future, the risk of climate change could become 
another driver impacting the system.  Insurance schemes were introduced in India during 
the colonial period by the British Government as part of the social protection for colonial 
officials. After independence in 1947, the life insurance industry was nationalised but in the 
1990s as part of a wider set of liberalisation and financial reforms, private insurance 
companies were again allowed to operate in India. Today there are 24 general insurance 
companies and 23 life insurance companies operating in the country (IRDA, 2012).  This 
trend in general insurance has also influenced the development of agricultural insurance in 
India. A timeline of the developments of agricultural insurance in India is shown below 
(more detail is included in Appendix 1).  
Figure 1:  Timeline of India’s crop insurance schemes 
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After a period of experimentation and development from 1965 – 1985, the first national 
compulsory schemes for farmers taking loans where introduced in 1985 and run till 2003, 
when a major revision of the insurance approach to crop risks took place. The main public 
schemes running today are the National Agricultural Scheme (NAIS) the modified NAIS, and 
Weather-Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS). The NAIS is the largest crop insurance 
scheme in the world with 25 million farmers insured (Mahul et al. 2012). However, it has not 
been without its critics. Several authors suggest the government scheme has very long claim 
times, is not trusted amongst farmers who have not seen payouts and pays out 
disproportionately to certain States such as Gujarat (Mahul and Verma, 2010; Manuamorn, 
2007; Veron and Majumdar, 2011). It also exposes the government to an open-ended 
liability due to the ex-post funding arrangement and variable annual contributions that are 
difficult to predict in advance of the harvest. Recognising the challenges with the existing 
national scheme, the Ministries for Finance and Agriculture and the AIC formed a joint task-
force to address the shortcomings and extend coverage. The report released in 2004 
suggested a review of the underwriting methodology, an actuarially sound methodology and 
pricing methodology acting as the basis for a move to ex-ante funded, market-based crop 
insurance and cost-effective catastrophe risk financing solutions for the public crop 
insurance company. The World Bank has been working with the Government of India (GoI) 
to develop an actuarially sound scheme and has helped develop a modified form of the 
NAIS.  
The timeline shows that since 2003 private insurance companies have played an increasing 
role in the agricultural insurance market, this is shortly after the insurance sector re-opened 
to private companies. Two publicly run schemes (the WBCIS and the mNAIS) have for the 
first time opened up to private operators who can bid to the State governments to run the 
schemes in different districts. As well as participation of the private sector in publicly run 
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schemes, private insurers also produce their own agricultural insurance products. Weather-
based index insurance for example was first piloted by ICICI Lombard and the NGO, BASIX. A 
form of weather insurance was then proposed in 2007 as a national government scheme 
that States can choose instead of the NAIS or mNAIS. Other companies have also developed 
their own products. For example, IFFCO Tokyo has a weather-index product Barish Bima 
Yojana. This sold 1200 policies across 7 States in the financial year 2011-12. The problem 
with these however is they do not attract government subsidy and so the premiums are 
much higher than government ones. In some cases the insurance may be subsidised by a 
company as in case of Pepsico Frito-Lay potato farmers. Pepsico uses contract framing to 
source potatoes from India. As part of this farmers can purchase index insurance and are 
incentivised to do so buy a slight increase in payment from Pepsico if they do so. The 
insurance produce is offered by ICICI Lombard. Farmers taking loans must take insurance. 
95% of Pepsico farmers choose to buy index insurance, this is an extremely high percentage 
given national uptake of agricultural insurance in general.  
 
There are several different functions that public and private actors can offer. Since 2003 the 
private sector has played a role in underwriting the risk, developing new products and 
gathering technical information and skills (such as weather data and developing indices). 
The overall rule-setting in terms of insurance law and regulation remains with governments 
(State and national) and applies to all schemes, but with different degrees of private 
autonomy and public involvement. The decision over entrance to the market rests to a large 
degree with government, in the form of insurance regulation. At the same time, there is also 
the decision by the private insurer to apply for a licence and enter a market. This highlights 
the relevance of commercial viability – which governs the private sector’s decision making. 
Beyond the entrance to the market the most important criteria is the rules and standards 
that govern products and operative issues.  As crop insurance in India shows, there exist a 
wide variety of arrangements. There appears to be a trend towards more actuarial pricing, 
rather than a flat premium structure. This would signal an important change in the risk 
governance approach, by attaching a price that signals risk levels. 
3.3 Challenges and barriers to private sector involvement 
A number of barriers to private sector involvement were identified by stakeholders. Several 
of these echo the findings of literature elsewhere on challenges to this field including 
limited demand, difficulty in distributing products and uncertainties in index products such 
as weather. Of particular interest to this paper however, is how these barriers might 
constrain adaptation. 
Firstly, the relationship with multiple tiers of government was complex and acted as barrier 
in some cases. The private insurers had to negotiate with the various State governments in 
gaining access to new markets due to licencing arrangements and overall insurance 
regulation and a lack of transparency over the political and regulatory decision-making 
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process was perceived as another barrier to further market and product development. One 
stakeholder talked about the inertia of the State to implement new schemes and prejudices 
against private companies. He also commented on the lack of technical expertise within 
State governments that constrained approval and acceptance of technical innovation of the 
products. Stakeholders commented that it was difficult to incorporate risk reduction 
measures due to the requirements and restrictions of the tendering process. This point was 
emphasised by other providers (including the AIC), arguing that despite the large amounts 
of public funds being spent on scheme subsidies there was very little public capacity to 
allow product differentiation or to evaluate the effectiveness of the schemes.  
Limited demand for insurance solutions was a widespread concern amongst stakeholders. 
This well-known challenge, which is common in most low-income and emerging economies, 
is impacted by a range of factors, such as affordability of cover, desirability of products and 
financial literacy of the farmers. The public insurance schemes try to overcome this 
challenge by making cover mandatory, linking it to loans and subsidizing premiums. The 
majority of current crop insurance products are linked to loans and so are sold in bulk to the 
bank or state government rather than directly to the farmer. There is therefore no 
insurer/farmer interface and little demand or understanding of the product. Several insurers 
felt that until the demand was driven by farmers there would be little incentive to improve 
the products or innovate to provide what the farmers really wanted. This lack of proximity 
between farmers and insurers almost made incorporating risk reduction methods difficult 
and product development is driven by the selection procedure of the State governments. On 
the other hand loan products are commercially attractive to the insurers as they create the 
needed market volume.  
The opening towards the private sector has introduced a degree of competition to the crop 
insurance system, amongst private insurers and between public and private providers. But 
there are concerns about imbalance between public and private providers.  A number of 
insurers said that the capacity to take on risks rather than the degree of competition were 
the biggest challenge to growing the market, and therefore competition did not act as a 
spur to develop and improve on products. As prices are mainly regulated by the 
government, there is not a competition over the price of the product. Insurers also talked 
about a range of technical barriers, such as lack of risk data.  
In addition to these barriers it is also important to understand the motivation and drivers for 
the engagement of private actors.  The model of a corporation like Pepsico that has had a 
product designed for their farmers and effectively subsidises its purchase with a higher buy-
back rate relies on the advantages to the company in long-standing relationships with 
farmers and a high quality, high yield product. Other motivations for private sector 
involvement in the schemes vary from a business commitment to farmer’s welfare (IFFCO-
Tokyo is an alliance between the Indian Farmer’s Fertilisers Cooperative and a Japanese 
insurance company), a long-standing interest in particular schemes (such as ICICI Lombard 
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working in index insurance since 2003), the need to fulfil rural quotas set by the regulator 
and a desire to build expertise and capacity in an area which is seen to be growing. 
Involvement is very new in this area in India, and it remains to be seen whether these 
motivations will continue to be sufficient to increase private sector involvement as 
envisaged in the Indian national strategy for climate change, the National Action Plan on 
Climate Change released in June 2008 (see Fisher 2012 for an overview of Indian climate 
policies). 
3.4 Agricultural insurance and climate change: a changing governance picture? 
Finally, we consider our findings in the context of climate change. Agricultural insurance 
schemes have been managing risk in India under current climatic conditions however some 
aspects of this risk governance may change under worsening climatic conditions. Under 
climate change, India is likely to experience greater variability of precipitation with less 
certainty over the arrival of the South-West monsoon and its duration. Agriculture is the 
most vulnerable sector to climate change in India. Increases in mean surface temperatures 
have been linked to decreased crop yields and duration in India and the latest IPCC 
assessment report predicts a 2.5-10% decline in crop yields in Asia in the 2020s and 5-30% 
decrease in the 2050s (Solomon et al., 2007). As climate change starts to introduce greater 
uncertainty into growing seasons and precipitation, insurance could become an important 
mechanism to transfer and mitigate risks. There is evidence that concerns about climate 
change are driving changes in policy frameworks and public regulation due to international 
agreements or national strategies which could affect governance structures; this could also 
influence the crop insurance schemes.  
India released its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in June 2008 with 8 
National Missions addressing mitigation and adaptation. The Mission for Sustainable 
Agriculture includes agricultural insurance as one of its ten interventions. Others include 
water efficiency, pest management and improved farming practices. The current 
intervention is illustrative of potential strategies and suggests a number of policies in the 
four areas of: research and development; technologies and practices; infrastructure and 
capacity building. The intervention suggests developing further insurance products and 
strategies to address emerging climate risks as well as extensive capacity building with 
farmers to increase demand and coverage of the products. Finally, the intervention also 
contains a commitment to the involvement of the private sector through public-private 
partnerships to increase aggregate insurance cover and “improve viability of the insurance 
schemes over time” (GoI, 2008 p49). It is clear then, that the Indian government foresees an 
important role for crop insurance in future adaptation strategies, and particularly the role of 
the private insurers. However, as noted at the beginning of the paper the model of 
engagement with private insurers as well as the costs and benefits to such actors of greater 
involvement in such schemes is left unexplored. 
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4. Analysis 
The previous section has outlined the broad relationship between risk transfer and risk 
reduction in insurance schemes in low and middle-income countries, and given a detailed 
analysis of agricultural insurance schemes in India. We now use these findings to make two 
arguments important to the governance of adaptation: First, our  example suggests that 
there is an opening of risk governance and adaptation to private actors but this is occurring 
within a particular model of engagement between public and private actors that has 
restricted the role private players can play. Secondly, in the context of climate change, how 
the public-private relationships are constructed is key to how adaptation can be leveraged 
from such an arrangement. 4.1 The increasing role of the private sector through delegation 
Firstly, we argue that there has been an increasing role for the private sector within risk 
governance but this has been within very particular model of engagement usually delegating 
services to the private sector. In line with the overall trend of deregulation and liberalisation 
of insurance in India the purely public schemes have been opening to private actors, in 
addition to the emergence of purely private schemes. Faced with growing problems in the 
public schemes and supported by the recognition of the importance of insurance as a risk 
management tool there appears to be a government commitment to expand the schemes 
and make them more effective. However, the relationships between public and private 
actors have changed over time, with different degrees of involvement and roles emerging. 
Figure 2 shows the main institutions of the public schemes and the private actors after 
2003.  
Figure 2: The changing relationships post 2003 (blue actors – public, green – private) 
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Beyond the national dynamics of the relationships, there are also transnational dimensions 
to the governance of risk in this context. Firstly, there are some multinational companies 
involved in the provision of crop insurance, for example in the IFFCO-Tokyo example or via 
reinsurance arrangements that both the public and the private actors need to gain access to 
if they wish to operate a large-scale scheme. Furthermore, the World Bank has been a key 
actor in reforming the national schemes, and as such has played a role in steering new 
arrangements through capacity building.  
As well as the increasing role of private actors in the governance of agricultural risk, 
applying the above findings to the framework of Borsel and Risse (2005) shows how the 
public-private arrangements are emerging in particular forms in India as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Schemes applied to Borsel and Risse framework 
Increasing autonomy of private actors                               Increasing autonomy of public actors 
Private self-
governance 
within the 
boundaries 
of insurance 
law 
Private self-
governance 
in the 
shadow of 
hierarchy (or 
opportunity) 
Delegation to 
private 
actors. 
Co-
governance 
of public and 
private 
actors 
Consultation 
and co-
option of 
private 
actors 
Public 
governance 
Pepsico 
NGO-schemes 
BASIX/WB/ICICI 
Lombard pilot 
mNAIS 
WBCIS (private 
actors 
underwrite risk, 
but operate 
within rules of 
the scheme set 
by government) 
  Experimental 
schemes 
CCIS 
NAIS 
 
The private sector has mainly become involved through a delegation of services from the 
public sector, although there is also some evidence of private governance in the shadow of 
hierarchy/opportunity. Differentiating between delegation and private self-governance one 
could say that delegation might  just be replicating what used to be done by the public 
sector before – possibly with different outcomes in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, 
but similar in terms of scale and scope. For private self-governance one could say that 
something new and additional has emerged – created by business interest (Pepsico’s supply 
chain), but with potential implications beyond the core self-interest group (such as village or 
community spill over).  The majority of the risk governance in this example is still a public 
issue. Within the current landscape of agricultural insurance in India there appears to be 
little scope for what has been termed “private governance” of adaptation. This is the 
management of climate risks through an entirely private and voluntary enterprise. The one 
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example of this, the Pepsico scheme, is currently very small scale but gives an indication of 
the kind of innovation that could result from companies protecting their own supply 
systems. 
4.2 The role of the public-private relationships in supporting adaptation outcomes 
Secondly, the empirical evidence of the Compendium and the India agriculture insurance 
case study suggest that the relationship between different actors and the nature of 
governance arrangements are important for determining the degree of adaptation and risk 
reduction triggered through insurance, as well as the potential for the theoretical 
advantages of private sector involvement. Our findings suggest the type of relationship and 
enabling environment created by the State is crucial for not only if, but also how, private 
actors can contribute to climate change adaptation. Stakeholder interviews suggest that the 
current model of engagement with private actors is not yet harnessing the theoretical 
advantages of private involvement beyond transferring financial liability (see section 3.3). 
Government rules and standards have created barriers to risk based pricing and product 
innovation. This suggests that governments need to reassess why they wish to involve the 
private sector. If, as widely suggested in policy discussions, it is to harness expertise and 
capacity as well as financial resources, then the enabling environment of the state must 
allow actors to develop these areas, to innovate and compete in order to deliver better 
adaptation measures.  But one also needs to ask to what extent private actor involvement in 
adaptation is compatible with commercial viability. The Pepsico example tells a positive 
story here, but at the same time commercial viability is often stated as a key barrier to 
further scaling up pilot projects.  
This aspect of innovation is important when considering the adaptation dimension of 
existing risk governance schemes. Our stakeholder interviews have highlighted further 
challenges and barriers for innovating insurance procedures and integrating risk reduction. 
Stakeholders suggest for example that they cannot currently develop better innovative 
products that incorporated risk mitigation as well as risk transfer or reduce the vulnerability 
of farmers. The highly technical nature of the product, the multi-levelled interactions with 
the State and the lack of transparency of product selection all form barriers to developing 
better products (see section 3.3). This is supported by a recent World Bank paper that also 
commented on the decreasing innovation in the index-scheme (Clarke et al., 2012).  
The Indian example shows that some public and private insurance schemes have 
incorporated risk reduction measures but stakeholders suggested these were difficult to 
monitor, and did not play a significant role in altering farmer’s behaviour. A key aspect for 
making insurance work in the context of adaptation is the ability to link the financial risk 
transfer to physical risk reduction. There is the potential for insurance to trigger behaviour 
change and increase resilience by putting a price on risk. So called ‘risk-based pricing’ can 
send a signal about the underlying exposure and create risk awareness as well as provide 
incentives for risk reduction. This principle of pricing according to risk often clashes with the 
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concept of maintaining affordability and increasing uptake of insurance. Subsidies and price 
caps can distort this signal and limit the risk reduction potential of insurance, while at the 
same time supporting growth of the schemes. How risk reduction can be more effectively 
built into private insurer schemes relates back to the question of how the relationship 
between the public and the private actor is constructed.  
The private scheme discussed in this paper (Pepsico) incorporated several risk reduction 
measures, perhaps due to the motivation of the company to reduce risks to their high-
quality supply chain. The Pepsico scheme requires farmers to use certain high quality seeds 
and gives them access to technical knowledge which may help build adaptive capacity. The 
mNAIS calculation of premium involves discounts to farmers with better water conservation 
practices and sustainable farming practices. Certain risky behaviours and crops may become 
un-insurable and this might encourage shifts into other sectors, although the penetration of 
crop insurance at the moment does not suggest it would act as a significant driver to alter 
farmer growing choices. If such schemes are to be used as part of adaptation to climate 
change measures it will be important to know how they reduce actual vulnerability 
compared to direct investments of a similar magnitude by the government. These 
considerations about linking risk transfer and risk reduction are also important in the 
context of ensuring future availability and affordability of insurance. The risk reduction will 
not only increase overall resilience, it will also help to maintain insurance as a viable option 
in the wake of rising future risk levels.  
As well as the national policy signal that suggests there could be some change under future 
climate change, the wider literature on climate change governance also suggests that new 
transnational partnerships, international funds (such as the Adaptation Fund, PPCRs), 
international agreements (such as the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage proposals), and research 
bodies may all alter the context of adaptation governance through information, rule-setting, 
capacity building and implementation. It is not yet clear how these actors might affect the 
governance of risk in this context, but for example international adaptation funds could 
alter the incentives for private actors to get involved in the sector through additional 
funding sources for premium subsidies, transnational networks could change ideas of best 
practice and effectiveness for adaptation through information dissemination, and national 
climate policies could provide strong drivers for growth in particular products and regions.  
5. Conclusions  
 
In conclusion, this paper has argued that using evidence from risk governance and analytical 
frameworks from the wider governance literature it is possible to draw important findings 
for the governance of adaptation. Policy discourse on adaptation has tended to hold a 
normative stance on the role of the private sector, whilst academic research has not yet 
explored how the roles of public and private actors might inter-relate, focusing instead on 
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more simplistic divisions between either public or private actors, national governments or 
communities (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Tompkins et al., 2010) Our research brings several 
important findings to the governance of adaptation. In contrast to work in the field that 
identifies the theoretical roles of different actors (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; 
Fankhauser and Burton, 2011) or capacities of national governments to respond (Brooks et 
al., 2005; Nathan L, 2011; Tol and Yohe, 2007), we argue that what is of crucial importance, 
is the relationships between such actors.  
The evidence in this paper suggests that due to commercial viability and other concerns 
there will continue to be a role for the public sector alongside the private sector to ensure 
adaptation measures address vulnerability. Secondly, we argue that the question is not 
purely about involving the private sector which is how this is currently framed within policy 
and academic work on adaptation, but how the private actors are engaged. How can the 
private sector be engaged in a way that allows the innovation and flexibility needed to build 
adaptive responses as well as ensuring that underlying social needs are met? We have 
shown in this paper how the type of relationship between the public and the private actors 
also has a significant influence on the adaptation outcomes or potential for responses, and 
governments seeking to engage private actors need to build those relationships with the 
desired adaptation outcomes in mind.  
As well as these initial conclusions, many questions remain about the role of the private 
sector in adaptation. One of these is how to design for adaptation effectiveness. We know 
from the Compendium that it is extremely challenging to assess the effectiveness of such 
measures in the context of climate change. Characteristics of what makes effective 
insurance for adaptation are still not well defined and the measurement of risk reduction 
has several methodological challenges (see Surminski and Oramas-Dorta 2011). Given this 
lack of certainty on how such initiatives contribute to risk reduction, it is extremely 
challenging for governments to create the terms of engagement with private sector 
involvement that will maximise this reduction in vulnerability. Whilst the Indian government 
has included crop insurance as part of its climate change plan and aims at increasing the 
level of including private sector involvement, without an understanding of how to make 
schemes work for adaptation this may not be effective. In an environment where farmers 
will be facing increasing, unknown risks, such protection may not be sufficient. Therefore 
advancing an understanding of the characteristics of effectiveness of insurance and other 
measures would be a significant step towards a more productive relationship between 
public and private actors in the context of adaptation.  
These findings have broader implications than the insurance industry. Other sectors such as 
utilities and transportation are involved in public-private relationships which could be used 
for climate change adaptation. The findings of the paper suggest that such relationships 
need to be built with adaptation outcomes in mind and designed specifically for adaptation 
effectiveness. Specific acknowledgement of the relative strengths of the private and the 
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public sectors is important for commercial viability as well as allowing an adaptive response 
that is innovative and flexible to respond to changing risks and growing uncertainties. 
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